Encrypted in transit and at rest
Matter files, extracted text, drafts, and strategy are encrypted in storage under a per-matter key. Sessions travel over HTTPS. Access is limited to the advocate and the scoped work they start.
How we protect a matter.
Luthor reads a matter to do the work. Files are encrypted, never sold, and never used to train models. Counsel reviews every output. You can delete a matter when you choose.
Never sold, never used to train models
We do not sell, rent, or advertise with matter data. Files, prompts, and outputs are not used to train general-purpose AI models. Production inference uses a reviewed business path, not a consumer account.
Delete a matter when you choose
Archive or delete a matter from Luthor. Disconnect Google at any time. Writes to Gmail or Drive happen only after you approve the exact content.
What is in place today
Private storage
Documents sit in a private bucket. The browser can upload; it cannot list or download objects. Reads go through the authenticated API, bound to you and the matter.
Tenant isolation
Matter ownership is enforced in the database with composite keys and row policies, not only in application code. Knowing an ID is not enough to open a file.
Application-layer encryption
Each sealed object uses its own AES-256-GCM key, wrapped under a matter key. A database dump or stolen backup yields ciphertext, not the file.
Egress controls
Client identifiers are stripped from public research queries. Court lookup, remote embeddings, and prompt caching stay off unless an operator turns them on. You can disable web search in Settings.
Untrusted documents
Orders and opponent papers are treated as data. They cannot grant the agent new tools, cross into another matter, or change what Luthor is allowed to do.
Header-only sessions
Tokens are never placed in URLs. Sensitive responses are marked no-store. Production errors do not include provider or database detail.
What we do not claim
Luthor has to read the file to work — including when you are not at the keyboard. We encrypt storage, but this is not a vault that even we cannot open. When a run starts, the AI provider receives the text needed for that job, under a business contract. We have not completed a SOC 2 or ISO 27001 audit, or an independent security test. Those are planned. They are not claimed here.
Luthor web and a future macOS app are separate products. They do not share a synced file store. CaseSeal remains a roadmap: we do not claim HSM, attested compute, or a shipped Mac vault today.
Questions or a vulnerability report: support@luthor.in. Use synthetic data only. See also the Privacy Policy and Terms of Use.